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A B S T R A C T
In this article, we critically review the developmental claims made for the construction of the Rampal power
plant in southwestern Bangladesh, in the light of evidence about transformations of land control related to this
construction project. Land has become a heavily contested resource in the salinity-intruded southwestern coastal
area of Bangladesh. Changes in land control for the construction of the Rampal power plant and similar projects
have intensified decades of struggles over rights and access to land. The Rampal project is labelled as “devel-
opment” and claims to contribute to the elimination of poverty. However, we find that, in reality, this project
leads to a reorganization of land control, rights and access in ways that perpetuate and intensify waves of
eviction and exclusion of small landholders and landless laborers, thus threatening agriculture-based rural li-
velihoods. We analyze how four actor groups involved in land control are differently affected by the project
interventions, embedded in the context of historical land tenure developments. We find that the benefits of this
“development”, primarily favoring rich and powerful social groups and investors, necessitates a critical re-
thinking of Bangladesh's development and its claims of poverty elimination in the light of related land control
practices.
1. Introduction
Bangladesh is facing challenges of population growth, poverty, po-
litical instability, climate change, and extreme weather events.
Especially changes in the densely populated coastal zone illustrate that,
in practice, ‘development’ means different things for different people.
The Bangladesh government has predicated its campaign on a platform
of national development and megaprojects like the Rampal coal-fired
power plant and the Dhaka underground, eyeing Bangladesh’s 50th
independence anniversary in 2021 to declare the country a middle-in-
come country. However, the brand of development pursued is not
without its critics. The Rampal power plant in Bagerhat District,
southwestern Bangladesh, discussed in this article, is highly con-
troversial (see e.g. Misra and Mookerjea, 2017). For one, the project’s
proximity to the world’s largest wetland, the Sundarbans, has en-
vironmentalists up in arms. A national platform, the National Com-
mittee to Protect Oil Gas Mineral Resources Power and Ports (NCBD),
resists the project on conservationist grounds and commissioned
scathing independent expert judgment, while transnational cam-
paigning led to its discussion at the Global Economic Forum in Davos
and moved climate celebrity Al Gore to beseech Bangladesh’s Sheikh
Hasina to stop the project.1
The present article critically engages, more fundamentally, with
justifications for the construction of the Rampal power plant in terms of
its purported contributions to development. These are rarely discussed
in such campaigns, and certainly did not feature in the Environmental
Impact Assessment for the project.2 While not denying that this project
may stimulate regional investments and create some employment op-
portunities, we focus on its murkier aspects: how it perpetuates existing
patterns of land control based on dispossession of the agrarian poor. At
least around Rampal, the industry-based development paradigm may,
in the future, even lead to deeper transformations by further reducing
agriculture-based and aquaculture-based labour and livelihood oppor-
tunities. Echoing Sassen’s (2010) qualification of development as a
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‘savage sorting of winners and losers’, we argue that the power plant
project and the industrial development model it claims to represent
produce many losers by excluding and dispossessing people from the
land they depend on. Such land transfers reproduce and strengthen
existing inequalities, power relations and exploitation. They im-
portantly involve illegal means, including corruption, threats and vio-
lence. Those who lose out are expelled or relocated, and further mar-
ginalized by neglect in this ‘development’ drive. We will show this
through an analysis of project-related land transfers and practices of
dispossession and exclusion, and the consequences for the lives of poor
and marginalized sections of the rural population.
Criticism of the ambiguities of development is not new, of course,
and has been eloquently expressed by authors like Crush (1995);
Escobar (1994); Ferguson (1990), and Lewis and Mosse (2006). We do
not seek to repeat such debates. Rather, we critically examine the de-
velopmental claims made by the Government of Bangladesh for the
Rampal project, by confronting these with a critical empirical analysis
of land acquisition practices and changing land control on which this
model is based. Our analysis of land transfer practices for the power
plant exposes the land transactions around its construction, and the
consequences for the poor and landless whose livelihoods depend on
secure access to land. On the basis of this analysis we will argue that a
critical re-thinking of this emerging power plant-pioneered type of
development is urgently needed. As this issue is seldom researched and
hardly publicly debated in Bangladesh, with this case study of the
Rampal power plant we aim to contribute to a more critical under-
standing of the problematic relationships between development ideol-
ogies and the practices of land acquisition and control that they set
going.
The article proceeds as follows: after this introduction, we first
discuss how issues of land control and dispossession are approached in
the literature and in this article, including research methodology.
Section 3 describes the background and context of shrimp farming,
power plant-led industrialization, and the Rampal case. The next sec-
tion presents our findings on the land control dynamics around the
Rampal project area. We structure our analysis by focusing on four
major types of land control involved in the project-induced changes.
Next, we proceed by discussing insights from the Rampal case study
about the claims made for the ‘developmental’ character of the project.
A short conclusion wraps up the argument.
2. Issue, approach and methods
2.1. Contested land investments
In the past decade, a key issue in debates about land investments
concerns the ways in which property rights, land control and access to
land are transferred from local populations to foreign enterprises for
agricultural or other uses. The impacts of such ‘land grabs’ have been
extensively documented, gradually also bringing in the nuances (see
e.g. Borras et al., 2011; Borras and Franco, 2012; GRAIN, 2008; Kaag
and Zoomers, 2014; Allan et al., 2013). The perpetrators of land grabs
are neither all foreign, nor always private companies from ‘the North’.
States receiving investors can be active facilitators of land transfers,
while not only western private companies but also foreign state en-
terprises or companies from the Middle East, Asia or elsewhere are
often involved. Further, the boundaries between ‘external’ perpetrators
and ‘community’ victims are often fuzzy, as the latter are often in-
ternally divided along lines of interests, identities, and power, while
patron-client relations, interest networks and power relations cross
community boundaries.
Notwithstanding these nuances, the resulting changes in land con-
trol often entail transfers of control, exclusion and dispossession of
those lacking the power and agency to defend their land rights. In South
Asia, the growing impact of state-initiated and state-facilitated invest-
ments, justified in terms of development, is clearly visible. From the
1970s, India saw many protest movements against land dispossession,
mainly for public sector investments and infrastructure, then still eu-
phemistically called ‘development-induced displacement’ (Levien,
2018: 1). In post-1992 India, the character of dispossession (defined by
Levien as ‘a social relation of coercive redistribution’; 2018, 4) has
crucially changed towards state facilitation of private corporate in-
vestments. While these continue to be justified as developmental, they
can also be seen as ‘dispossession without development’ (Levien, 2018)
or ‘everyday forms of land grabbing’, mainly targeting weaker groups in
society (Adnan, 2016). A ‘predatory theory of dispossession’ (Levien,
2018), then, looks beyond the narratives of national progress and de-
velopment, while focusing attention on dispossession.
2.2. Land, exclusion and dispossession in Bangladesh
The predatory dimensions of ‘developmental’ investments also
characterize the Rampal power plant case. Like India, Bangladesh is
undergoing rapid agrarian transformations, with important con-
sequences for how, to what purposes, and by whom land is controlled
and used. In southwestern Bangladesh, rural producers have massively
shifted from food crops into export-oriented fishpond-based shrimp and
prawn cultivation, influenced by internationalizing markets. Export-
oriented aquaculture production zones have not only caused environ-
mental degradation —invoking the spectre of a 'desert in the delta'
(Swapan and Gavin, 2011)— but also radical changes in land control,
concentrating landownership in the hands of powerful elites (see
Adnan, 2013). More recent trends show de-agrarianization, involving
rural development pathways in which agricultural and aquacultural
land is accumulated for infrastructural and industrial investments.
Thus, the growing embeddedness of rural Bangladesh in global capi-
talist production influences food security, food sovereignty and the
occurrence of malnutrition (Edelman et al., 2014; Misra, 2017, 2018;
Mookerjea and Misra, 2017; Paprocki and Cons, 2014).
These processes push out smallholders and marginal farmers, in-
tensifying land-related political conflicts (Adnan, 2013; Afroz et al.,
2017). Often predatory elites and bureaucrats, corruption, and the use
of threats, force and violence are involved (Adnan, 2013; Feldman and
Geisler, 2012). Land conflicts and land alienation through exclusion
and dispossession have become increasingly well documented. Adnan
(2013), for instance, analyses deltaic land grabs as processes of primi-
tive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession. The same author
(Adnan, 2016) has argued that land alienation in Bangladesh requires
scientific attention to how it is produced: by a variety of actors, pro-
cesses, and mechanisms, in complex interactions of neoliberal globali-
zation, state policies and interventions, and involving power struggles,
threats, violence, and resistance. Land alienation mechanisms can, for
instance, be coercive or voluntary, direct or indirect, intentional or
unintentional, and market-based or nonmarket-based (Adnan, 2013,
2016). Feldman and Geisler (2012: 1971) stress the importance of
paying more attention to loss of land and livelihoods, and human dis-
placement through the ‘more banal, less legible dealings that are in-
ternal to particular national contexts’. The authors relate in-situ and ex-
situ displacement to corruption, political instability, class politics, crony
capitalism and collusion between politicians, bureaucrats and legal
institutions. Landlessness, unstable land access and displacement are
aggravated by the influence of climate change on the quantity and
quality of agricultural land (Paprocki and Cons, 2014; Routledge,
2015).
The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
(BBS), 2011) categorizes land on the basis of land holding.3 ‘Absolute
landlessness’ refers to people who do not hold any land (homestead or
operated). ‘Non-farm holding’ refers to the ‘functionally landless’,
3 “A techno-economic unit of agricultural production under single manage-
ment … without regard to title, legal form or size.” (BBS, 2011:13).
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referring to households which have neither cultivated nor operated
land or have cultivated land less than 0.05 acre (Bangladesh Bureau of
Statistics (BBS), 2011). For ‘farm holding’4, there are three categories:
small, medium and large. The first refers to holdings between 0.05 and
2.49 acres, in which ‘marginal’ land holdings, between 0.05 and 0.49
acres, are also included. ‘Medium farm holdings’ have a size between
2.50 and 7.49 acres (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 2011).
‘Large farm holdings’ have a size of 7.50 acres and above (Bangladesh
Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 2011). The World Bank (2002) has estimated
that around 48 % of the rural population of Bangladesh is functionally
landless (Paprocki and Cons, 2014). Aggregate data suggest ongoing
land concentration but do not show a clear trend of outright dis-
possession of smallholder peasants (Misra, 2017: 605).5 Dispossession,
however, is a key dimension of the Rampal case discussed here.
2.3. Conceptual approach and research methods
Following Peluso and Lund (2011: 668), we see ‘land control’ as
‘practices that fix or consolidate forms of access, claiming, and exclu-
sion for some time’. The authors distinguish various mechanisms
available for actors to control land: (1) primitive accumulation, en-
closure and privatization; (2) territorialization; (3) legalization; (4)
force and violence. Legal discourses, often framed in terms of ‘property’,
are central to these processes, to authorize, justify, normalize, enforce
or contest land control. ‘Property’, theorized in legal anthropology as
bundles of rights, restrictions and obligations with regard to resources
(von Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006), opens up avenues in analysing
(social) property relations beyond simple ‘ownership’. Further, it allows
analysis of property as ‘layered’, distinguishing between property
ideologies, categorical (formalized; legal-institutional) manifestations
of property (as, for instance, in law), and concretized social relations
and practices around property in specific contexts.
Ribot and Peluso (2003) move beyond an exclusive property focus,
‘putting property in its place’ (2003: 155), as there are more ways to
establish, maintain or expand land control. Access theory, with ‘access’
defined as the ‘ability to benefit’, usefully broadens the perspective. The
authors distinguish several processes and —rights-based (legal and il-
legal) as well as structural and relational— mechanisms for estab-
lishing, maintaining or expanding access (see also Sikor and Lund,
2009; for Bangladesh, see Afroz et al., 2017). Hall et al. (2011) explore
land control through the prism of exclusion. ‘Exclusion’, ‘the ways in
which people are prevented from benefiting from things’ (2011: 7), is
not only the opposite of access, but also a crucial dimension of property,
its making and its transformations. It is ‘double edged’: while functional
in tenure systems, its exclusionary effects may create contestation,
conflict and livelihood insecurity. The four interacting ‘powers’ of ex-
clusion discerned by the authors—regulation, force, market and legit-
imation— can be researched through a focus on processes and actors
(Hall et al., 2011: 7). With Levien (2018: 4), finally, we define ‘dis-
possession’ as ‘a social relation of coercive redistribution’. Dispossession
can be seen as one specific form of ‘alienation’ or ‘appropriation’, a
‘transfer of effective or de facto control over land rather than formal or
de jure rights of ownership and operation (Hall, 2013:1585; in: Adnan,
2016). Adnan (2016: 7) has developed a typology of alienation, which
can be direct or indirect, forced or unforced.
These closely interrelated and partially overlapping concepts are
indispensable for understanding the complex interactions and trans-
formations around land uses, claims and rights discussed below. As will
be discussed below, the simple state categorizations of land as property,
defined in terms of categorical rights, hide the wide diversity of ar-
rangements, social relationships and practices for access to, exclusion
from, and control of land that are actually existing ‘on the ground’.
Even entitled land can be literally ‘up for grabs’, while those who are
not entitled to land but can use money, political influence and power
can grab their way into land and even turn it into ‘property’. Our
analysis of changing land control in the Rampal case provides various
examples of these complex and deeply contested land issues.
Fieldwork was executed by the first author between August and
October 2016, following a qualitative case study approach. The Rampal
project was chosen as a highly relevant case for in-depth research on land
transformations in projects legitimized through a development narrative
(de Vaus, 2013). The research consisted of fieldwork — using, among
others, ethnographic methods— in villages of Rampal Upazila (subdistrict)
adjacent to the project site, in-depth interviews with key informants and
informants beyond that area, and the analysis of secondary documents.
Thus, the ‘field’ was not limited to one locality; actors (e.g. project au-
thorities, government representatives, environmental activists), connec-
tions and networks beyond ‘the local’ were included. Primary data were
collected through informal and unstructured interviews and observation
methods. Observation notes were taken systemically and used for data
triangulation. In addition, project documents, institutional data, policy and
project reports, newspapers, blog posts, online discussion forums, and
Google images were used. Before doing this fieldwork, the first author was
involved as a consultant in the Environmental Impact Assessment study for
the power plant in 2012 and in the Environmental and Social Monitoring
study in 2014. Knowledge gained through both studies enriched our un-
derstanding of the case.
3. Shrimp farming, industrialization, and the Rampal power plant
The southwestern coastal area of Bangladesh is known for its export-
oriented brackish water shrimp cultivation (Ali, 2006; Karim, 2006;
Deb, 1998). Its precise history in the Southwest Region is unknown.
Local people used to collect wild shrimps from nearby rivers and started
small-scale cultivation for trading purposes in the 1960s (Rahman et al.,
2006; Pokrant, 2014). Outside entrepreneurs first attempted shrimp
cultivation for trading purposes in the late 1960s. In the first half of the
1970s, this group exported shrimps abroad on a small scale. This got its
pace through commercial cultivation from the mid-1970s (Pokrant,
2014; Tutu, 2006), thanks to higher demand from the global market,
profitability and favourable government policies (Alauddin and Tisdell,
1998). Enclosure-like farms near rivers or canals were used to entrap
wild fry with tidal water.
The current form of export-oriented aquaculture began in the early
1980s, under the influence of a structural adjustment program (Sobhan,
2007; see Ali, 2006; Afroz et al., 2017). The number of shrimp culti-
vators grew rapidly, and relatively small landholders became involved
in shrimp cultivation. Many landowners converted their cropland into
fishponds, partly because of high returns and partly because of salinity-
driven externalities. This expansion continued until the early 1990s. In
this period, both local and external cultivators took control of local crop
land, converted into fishponds, by means of grabbing and leased-in
public and private lands. Land for shrimp cultivation came to be in-
creasingly controlled by rich and powerful shrimp cultivators. This led
to conflicts about land control (Adnan, 2013; Pokrant, 2014; Rahman
et al., 2006).
To promote shrimp farming, in 1992 the national government for-
mulated its Shrimp Estate (Mohal) Management Policy (SEMP).
Through the National Fisheries Policy (1998) it also encouraged private
sector investment in commercial shrimp seed production. However,
production trends gradually declined from the 1990s, mainly due to
diseases and the unavailability of healthy shrimp fry, salinity-driven
negative externalities on the ecosystem, crop-based food supply and
human health, and conflicts about land and water. In response, anti-
shrimp resistance blocked further expansion of shrimp cultivation in
some areas, causing the ousting of shrimp cultivators and the re-
conversion of fishponds into cropland (Nijera Kori, 2006; see Paprocki
4 BBS (2011:13) defines a farm holding as “an agricultural production unit
having cultivated land equal to or more than 0.05 acres.”
5 For a good description of village-level land relations, see Afroz et al., 2017.
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and Cons, 2014).6
In this context, the state has recently started the introduction and
expansion of industrial activities in the southwest, especially the
coastline, claiming this industrialization as ‘development’. In the re-
gionalizing and globalizing economy of Bangladesh, big capital-in-
tensive investment projects are on the increase (Khan et al., 2016).
Through its visions (Vision 2021 and Vision 2041), ‘the government
under the dynamic leadership of Sheikh Hasina is striving to turn
Bangladesh into a middle-income country by 2021 and a developed one
by 2041’. In both, the power and energy sector has absolute priority.
Vision 2041 presents industrialization as the key to progress; the power
and energy sector receives a large share of the development budget.
According to the Power Sector Master Plan (PSMP) of 2016, Bangladesh
is currently moving to phase 2 of industrialization, and likely to move
toward phase 3. While both phases are export-oriented, phase 2 is la-
bour-intensive and phase 3 technology- and capital-intensive.
Significant land accumulation is required for this process: the gov-
ernment is now developing Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Export
Processing Zones (EPZ), provides incentives to Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), and relaxes environmental and other regulations to
enable industrial development. Thus, six out of one hundred SEZs in the
entire country are to be established soon in the Southwest region; four
in Bagerhat District and two in Khulna District. This establishment
targets acceleration of the country’s industrialization process to achieve
a national GDP growth rate of 10 % by 2021. An authoritative body
—Bangladesh Economic Zone Authority (BEZA)— run directly by the
Prime Minister’s office has been established to this purpose in 2010.7
These developments are closely linked to broader visions on re-
gional trade. The Southwest Region was recently mentioned as a new
growth center, national and international trade gateway, connecting
the area with countries like Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan and (eastern)
India. In this framework, the southwest region will become connected
with the Southwest Bangladesh Economic Corridor (SWBEC).8 This
transport trunk project intends to diversify the country’s export basket
by integrating this area into a regional economic corridor, which is
aligned with the international transport corridor projects under the
South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation, the Bay of Bengal In-
itiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, and the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
In line with such visions, the government, jointly with India, is
constructing the Rampal coal-fired power plant in the Rampal Upazila
of Bagerhat District in the southwestern coastal area, with an estimated
investment of USD 1.5 billion (Center for Environmental and
Geographic Information Services (CEGIS), 2013; The Guardian, 2015).
For its construction, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was
signed between the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and
the National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. (NTPC) from India in
2010 (Ahsan, 2011). The agreement, signed in 2012, led to the for-
mation of the Bangladesh-India Friendship Power Company Limited
(BIFPCL), a joint venture company (Ritu, 2013). The vision also allows
the establishment of industries in Rampal and its surroundings, espe-
cially in the Pasur and Mongla river catchments. Presented as a pioneer
project, the Rampal plant is claimed to bring about development
throughout Rampal Upazila, primarily by attracting industrial activ-
ities.9 While construction is still going on, several industrial projects
were initiated nearby. This power plant-led industrial-type of devel-
opment is meant to partly replace existing shrimp cultivation practices
(by acquiring and converting considerable fishpond areas) on the one
hand, and to increase the export basket of shrimp (by expanding the
shrimp cultivation area and further developing the aqua-industrial
sector) on the other.10
In the Rampal area, this process is in full swing: the government of
Bangladesh has accumulated much land for the power plant by con-
verting shrimp ponds (Muhammad, 2013). It has acquired all land of
the Sapmari KatakhaliMauza11 of Rampal Upazila (1,834 acres), mostly
shrimp ponds (Muhammad, 2013; Center for Environmental and
Geographic Information Services (CEGIS), 2013). Before the land ac-
quisition, 386 people, including absolute landless, functionally landless
and smallholders lived here permanently in 104 households, with ad-
ditional basic infrastructure like small shops and an informal school
(Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 2012; Center for Environmental
and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS), 2013). Of the total land
area, 95.1 % was used for shrimp cultivation and 0.8 % for human
settlement, including homestead gardening (Center for Environmental
and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS), 2013). In August 2013,
the Department of the Environment (DoE), the designated government
authority, conditionally approved the construction (South Asians for
Human Rights (SAHR), 2015). However, land acquisition and other
project activities had begun before this approval, and have continued
since then (Muhammad, 2013).
Rampal is not an isolated case: in 2012, the government allowed a
private company, Orion Power Khulna Ltd. (OPKL), to take control of
more than 200 acres of land for constructing another coal-fired power
plant with a 630MW capacity (The Daily Star, 2012). Inspired by these
initiatives, other companies began to establish industries in this area
with immense profit-making potential. All these enterprises are in
progress simultaneously, supported by some and opposed by others.
The projects are expected to boost industrial and other investments
around the Sundarbans area in southwestern Bangladesh.12 To estab-
lish, among others, sawmills, rice mills, shipyards, food processing
centers and cement factories, in 2016 around 300 investors had already
gained control over more than 10,000 acres of village land, by legal and
illegal means.13
If this trend is going to continue, this will not just be a functional
land conversion, but entail a more radical transformation of land con-
trol. It may further disrupt the shrimp cultivation-based land tenure
system, nowadays largely controlled by rich and powerful shrimp cul-
tivators. They have often gained control over land by enclosing private
land for a certain rent period (hari)14, by leasing state-owned khas15
land, by grabbing private and khas land, and by benefiting from smaller
famers’ selling of private land degraded by salinity. Although small and
marginal landholders have been increasingly pushed out through these
processes, many landholders (65.49 % of all farm holdings in Rampal
6 Anti-shrimp campaigns are led by left-wing political parties and some
NGOs, such as Nijera Kori, well known for mobilizing anti-shrimp resistance.








10 Expansion of shrimp cultivation can still take place where brackish water
shrimp is not cultivated yet. Moreover, low shrimp yields due to diseases and
natural disasters have often discouraged shrimp cultivators. Aqua- / agro-in-
dustrial initiatives may revitalize this export sector more.
11 A mauza is a land administrative or revenue collection unit, in which land
is divided into different plots in well-demarcated cadastral maps (see Islam,
2003; Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS, 2011).
12 The Sundarbans is the largest estuarine ecosystem in the Indian sub-
continent, with the largest mangrove forest in the world. It is located in
Bangladesh (60%; 5,770 km2 and India (40%; 4,260 km2). Part of it has gained
the UNESCO World Heritage Status in 1997 (Quader et al., 2017).
13 See https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/article/940471/
14Hari: a local system in which private land is leased out for a certain rent
period.
15 Khas: land in the coastal zone influenced by river and tidal activity (so-
called char land) that was brought under state ownership (see Adnan, 2013;
Routledge, 2015).
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Upazila) of this category are still sustaining (Bangladesh Bureau of
Statistics (BBS), 2011; see Afroz et al., 2017). Aside from elite groups
controlling shrimp land, small and marginal landholders, landless
people and other poor and powerless actors have struggled to sustain
access to land-based livelihoods (see Bernier et al., 2016). However, the
power plant-led development model may further change land tenure by
re-fixing land control, allocating the benefits of land transfers to a few
while largely excluding the poor and powerless.
Although the transformations discussed in this paper were largely
externally driven, local actors played an active role. These included
ruling party political actors, local land dealers, mastaans16 (see Box 1)
and other vested interest groups. Those who lost land or resisted often
came into conflict about their land with these coopted actors. Project
supporters often acted as land dealers and grabbers of khas and private
land, intimidating people who resisted. Those losing land and landless
people protested through organized demonstrations and attempts to
block the entrance of (new) land claimants and grabbers. However, the
latter often managed to establish full control of the land, showing the
importance of inequality and power differences in land tenure relations
(see Hall et al., 2011).
The land dynamics related to this new development desire, partly
based on and partly next to shrimp cultivation, leads us to rethink the
meaning of ‘development’ more critically, also in view of the regional
statistics on poverty. Although regional data (Khulna region and
Rampal Upazila) on poverty show a slightly decreasing trend, they re-
main far above the national average (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
(BBS), 2000, 2005a; 2005b, 2010). This raises the question why poverty
is so rampant, while ‘development’ initiatives continue since the 1980s,
and why such initiatives are so contested locally. The answer lies per-
haps in the related ‘land deals’ and their consequences for the liveli-
hoods of those who are losing out (while those who migrate out of the
region are not even represented in the regional statistics).17
4. Dynamics of land control and dispossession for the Rampal
power plant
4.1. Aquaculture and the power plant: a new dynamic in land control
As described above, land competition in the coastal area has been
considerably boosted by shrimp cultivation. Land conversion from
crops to aquaculture had been promoted by the government and local
actors who stood to gain from this ‘development’ model. However, the
related land deals were largely controlled by political elites, thugs,
business entrepreneurs and other powerful groups, pushing out poor,
powerless, landless, small and marginal landholders from the land they
had operated or owned before (see also Adnan, 2013; Afroz et al.,
2017). These developments have also deeply influenced land tenure in
Rampal Upazila.
Land tenure data in Rampal Upazila show a clear polarization in
land control or landholding. Table 1 shows that 28.10 % large and
medium landholders controlled 81.32 % of total farm land in 1983-84,
when the commercial shrimp cultivation boomed. Although decreasing,
this group still controls 63.55 % in 2008. However, the average holding
size remains almost the same from 1983 to 1984 (17.29 acres) to 2008
(17.25 acres). This average does not reflect the actual field situation;
some medium and large holders with political influence may actually
control much more land. The number of smallholders also decreased,
but their holding size remained almost the same between 1983–1984
(0.80 acre) and 2008 (0.81 acre). However, the number of non-farm
and landless households had almost doubled in 2008, implying growing
land concentration and landlessness in the study area (Bangladesh
Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 2011).
Land deals for the power plant and other investments added another
dynamic in land control: they pushed out landholders from their
homesteads and livelihoods. Comparing Google images of the area from
2012 to 2019, a physical land transformation can be seen, followed by
land accumulation for the power plant (Fig. 1). In the image, blue-lined
area refers to the Rampal power plant, which had just been accumu-
lated in 2012 and filled with sand later (2019 image). Spatial analysis
on google images18 also shows that an additional 1666 acres of shrimp
ghers have been sand-filled (red lines in 2019 image after 2012. These
land transformations are continuing and inextricably connected to the
processes of dispossession discussed below. Thus, about 3500 acres of
land including land acquired for the power plant have been sand-filled
for industrial establishment until 2019.
4.2. Property categories and land tenure practices
According to the state definition, land is largely covered by two
property categories: state-owned khas land and privately owned titled
land. The land ceiling system (East Bengal State Acquisition and
Tenancy Act of 1950) vests property rights to land above 33 acres in the
government (Adnan, 2013). This excess land is defined as khas, and
hence exclusively under state ownership. Beyond this simple catego-
rical classification of land as property, in practice land can be operated,
accessed or controlled in various tenurial and property arrangements,
with or without state-derived legal entitlement. Thus, land tenure
practices and their property dimensions allow for a much greater
Box 1
A case of thugs (mastaan) and political power in changing land control.
Mr. Mainul, a smallholder, owned one acre of land in the power plant project area. He and his two sons cultivated shrimp after having
converted the land into shrimp gher. In 1998, a group of mastaans hired by a chairman of Mr. Mainul’s Union Parishad (UP) forced him to give
his land in hari (lease), which he refused. Later he found that his shrimps had died due to poisoning. As a result, he had to take a loan to
maintain his family and invest in shrimp cultivation again. Meanwhile, the hired mastaans continued intimidating him into leasing out land to
the chairman, and warned him that poisoning the gher might occur again. In late 1999, he agreed to lease out land to the chairman with a
verbal agreement. He received the lease money in the subsequent seasons. After a few years, the UP chairman stopped paying the lease money.
When asked about it, the chairman proposed him to sell the land, but he and his family decided not to do this. The chairman’s hired mastaans
then tried to grab his dalil (legal land document) by intimidation, but did not succeed. Although this UP chairman is no longer in power, Mr.
Mainul could not regain control over his land because of the influential position of the former chairman and the interference of mastaans. In the
power plant project, Mr. Mainul saw an opportunity for a land sale (since he still held the legal land document). He tried selling it to many
people, but nobody was interested after hearing that the land was under the control of a former UP chairman. On the other hand, local thugs,
with professional land brokers, started to work for the incoming investors. They forced landholders, including Mr. Mainul to sell their land,
evicted landless people from khas land, and grabbed khas land in cooperation with the local land office. An example is the Orion Power Khulna
Limited, which occupies 200 acres of land near the power plant
16Mastaan: thug, goon; either hired in or operating independently.
17 We do not go into the details of these poverty data, because of their limited
reliability. 18 Google Earth 2012 & 2019. Geospatial Images. Google Inc.
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diversity than formal legal property categories, policies and ideologies
would suggest (see also von Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006).
In this study, we found four major types of land controlling groups,
affected variously by the changes in land control for the Rampal power
plant: 1) entitled landowners; 2) absolutely landless people; 3) leaseholders;
4) powerful and politically connected elite landholders. People in these
categories hold land rights and have access by several means: using
legal documents, paying government fees, making a contract for rental
or other arrangements, using muscle, corruption, political, institutional
and economic power etc. Table 2 presents an overview of types and
modes of land control in the study area, also showing the land dynamics
in terms of the powers behind access and control, and the previous
controllers of land before the project.
The following sub-sections discuss how these categories of land-
holders created, sustained or lost control over land, and what happened
to them in the land accumulation for the power plant.
4.2.1. Entitled landowners
Entitled landowners have legal, state-recognized landownership
documents. This group comprises non-farm landowners or functionally
landless (with a homestead and/or operated land up to 0.05 acre), small
(0.05–2.49 acres land), medium (2.50–7.49 acres land) and large
landowners (7.50 and above acres of land). Before project accumulation
started there were 11 non-farm / functionally landless holdings, 119
small landholdings, 14 medium landholdings and eight large land-
holdings in the project area (BBS, 2011). All had titled land, while for
many the size of the landholding they operated was bigger than their
ownership. Large landholders operated most land (including khas and
private land). In this section we discuss dispossession of owned land;
what happened to leased-in and grabbed land will be discussed later.
From the 1980s, small, medium and large landowners used to cul-
tivate shrimp commercially. Small landowners have a diverse history of
land conversion into shrimp gher.19 Some turned cropland into fish-
ponds, motivated by high returns from shrimp production. Many also
involuntarily transformed their land in reaction to its inundation with
saline water caused by adjacent shrimp cultivators and politically
powerful actors, often in cooperation with mastaans (see Roy, 2017).20
However, this group has always been struggling to protect its rights and
Table 1
Land control situation throughout Rampal Upazila in different census years.
Source: BBS, 2011.
Year* Non-farm/landless (0-0.05 acre) Smallholder (0.05–2.49 acre) Medium & Large holder (2.50+ acre)












2008 35.73 6.1 0.23 49.14 30.36 0.81 15.13 63.55 17.25
1996 28.48 1.5 0.09 51.96 25.73 0.79 19.56 72.73 16.42
1983-84 19.27 0.6 0.06 52.63 18.08 0.80 28.10 81.32 17.29
**Data were adapted and synthesized.
* Agriculture Censuses were conducted in these years; the 2008 census, published in 2011, is the latest one.
Fig. 1. Spatial extent of land transformations in the study area for industrial setups.
19 Shrimp aquaculture ponds.
20 For violence by mastaans (also referred to as mastaan), their connectedness
to political parties, and their changing role in urban Bangladesh, see Jackman
(2018).
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access to land against intimidations by mastaans and politically pow-
erful actors. Small landowners could often only sustain their rights and
access through shrimp cultivation.
Some small landowners had homesteads on titled land, on khas land,
or on both types. All non-farm landowners used to live in the power
plant project area. They were largely involved in shrimp farm labour,
while some cultivated shrimp in small fishponds (0.01 acre and less)
near their homesteads. Some functionally landless and smallholders had
small shops for additional income. Land accumulation dispossessed
them of both production land and homesteads. Land acquisition took
place following the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property
Ordinance of 1982, which pays very little attention to public con-
sultation and stakeholder engagement in project planning and execu-
tion. The government gave cash compensation for acquired land to ti-
tled landowners only. Landowners were not involved in decision-
making; the authorities prepared a Land Acquisition Plan (LAP), which
was mandatory for all landholders. Although non-farm and small
landowners refused to give their land, the state, often supported by
interest groups, forcefully dispossessed them.
This process also dispossessed large and medium landowners, who
used to cultivate shrimp, including political bosses and politically
connected, often rich, shrimp cultivators. Initially, they turned their
cropland into shrimp gher, perceiving the higher returns. Especially the
large landowners increased their farm (gher) size by leasing in land
(hari), grabbing khas land and private land, and purchasing titled land.
For purchasing land, this group often used its political influence, muscle
and financial power. Powerful themselves or connected to powerful
politicians, they often used supporters and thugs for inundating the
land with salty water or intimidating smallholders to sell land, with
financial benefits or political positions for their supporters in return.
While some landowners resisted and rejected compensation, many did
agree and received compensation. They often acted in the government’s
interest because of their political affiliation to the ruling party.
The 1982 ordinance provides cash compensation for those who lose
entitled land, which is considered a fair way of dealing with dis-
possession.21 However, those who lost land are responsible themselves
for restoring their living and livelihoods. The question whether the
compensation is sufficient to restore at least their previous condition is
not asked. This study reveals that compensation is often insufficient,
with diverse negative consequences for landholders. First, the amount
of compensation matters for the owners. According to the state rule, the
Deputy Commissioner (DC) is responsible for determining the ‘market
value’ of acquired land on the date of notice of acquisition. The DC gets
the land value from the concerned sub-register office, and then adds a
50 % premium of the assessed land value for Cash Compensation under
Law (CCL). However, since owners usually report lower values during
registration to pay lower taxes, the addition of 50 % is still below the
market price. Land losers in the study area received a compensation
three times as low as the market value. Especially small or marginal
holders loosing land tried to purchase land elsewhere, but the com-
pensation was insufficient. Land prices have skyrocketed as en-
trepreneurs and land dealers are searching land, which limits options
for purchasing land.
Second, the process of determining compensation is often complex
and unfair. To be eligible, landowners have to prove ownership by
producing a record of rights. The records of rights (in line with the State
Acquisition and Tenancy Act 1950, revised in 1994) are not always
updated. Hence landowners often faced difficulties to ‘prove’ owner-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21 Financial compensation for the Rampal project was given in accordance
with this Ordinance, which became an Act in 2017. This updated Act increases
land compensation to three times the market price. This is, no doubt, an im-
provement, but still does not solve the enormous financial and other problems
for those who are dispossessed and have to adapt their livelihoods.
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also produce a rent or payment receipt of the land development tax.
However, this is impossible if a person was exempted from rent pay-
ment because the area is less than 8.33 acres. This created problems for
small landowners (see above) in particular. The study reveals that al-
most all small landowners faced problems in getting compensation.
Even with the required documents, the need to bribe government of-
ficials was common: landholders had to pay five to seven per cent of the
compensation money. Additional expenses were often needed for visits
to the district land office for arbitration. Such expenses considerably
reduced farmers’ ability to purchase new land.
Third, the study found that getting hold of suitable gher land to
restore shrimp-based livelihoods is difficult. Since actors of this group
have experience with shrimp cultivation, they tried to continue the
same occupation, which requires gher land. However, most land is al-
ready occupied by shrimp cultivators. Hence, many of them migrated
elsewhere to adopt alternative livelihood options.
Finally, cash compensation caused problems with inherited land for
small and marginal owners. Inherited land refers to land that each in-
heritor receives from an ancestor. The land is usually distributed among
inheritors, causing land fragmentation. However, small shrimp culti-
vators usually do not split up their land but construct a single gher
under joint control. They do so because they actually form a joint fa-
mily in which family benefits and expenses are shared. In this way they
can also share the high input costs, have the advantage of scale (shrimp
production in smaller ghers is lower), and avoid extra loss of land for
dyke construction for separated gher. However, the land accumulation
disrupted these family-based tenure practices and the joint livelihood
system. The compensation changed the motives of inheritors, as each
inheritor received his/her share separately. As compensation is fully
based on a nuclear family system, it makes receivers think and act
primarily in terms of individual (nuclear) family interests. Joint in-
heritors thus became competitors, which negatively affected their li-
velihoods (see Box 2).
4.2.2. Absolute landless people
There were 31 households (30 % of 104 households) of absolute
landless (BBS, 2012; CEGIS, 2013) in the study area. They used to live
and base their livelihoods on project-accumulated land. Although
landless, these people occupied state-owned khas to build their home-
steads. They were mainly shrimp farm labourers. Some tried to culti-
vate shrimp on khas land near their homesteads but failed because of
threats by powerful gher owners. Since this group had no titled land,
capital and power to control khas land, they depended on gher owners
and often had to work for, or maintain a good relation with, powerful
actors to avoid their khas land being grabbed.
In principle, this group holds khas land in at least two ways: as al-
location from the government to the landless (allottee), and as land
occupied without legal documents (non-allottee). In 1972, the govern-
ment promulgated a land reform law (Presidential Order 135) to dis-
tribute state-owned khas among poor farmers (Siddiqui, 1981). How-
ever, this Property Rights and Allotment Law was modified in 1974,
making households with much land (up to 33.33 acres) eligible for al-
lotment of khas land (Adnan, 2013). Hence the government allocates
khas land to both big shrimp cultivators and landless people in an unjust
way. Field data show that only 48 out of 4552 landless households in
Rampal Upazila received agricultural khas land (0.06 acre per house-
hold; totaling 2.88 acres) as allottee in 2015 (interview, 2016).22 Al-
though the official record shows an amount of 1578.03 acres of agri-
cultural khas lands available for allotment, landless people received a
mere 0.18 % (Rampal Upazila website, 2016).23 As a result, many
landless people settled on khas land as non-allottee, while most khas is
illegally controlled (grabbed) by, or leased out to, politically powerful
actors for shrimp cultivation.
The local land office and powerful landholders regard landless poor
who migrated into the area as dakhaldars (encroaching squatters). From
this marginalized position, they are continuously struggling for access
to khas land with the land office, big landholders, politically powerful
actors and mastaans. The land office strives to regain full control over
land or lease it out to shrimp cultivators, whereas powerful landholders
and mastaans seek a lease or grab for shrimp farming. The latter have
detailed information about khas land: its location, who controls it, this
person’s political affiliation, etc. This powerful group receives in-
formation from people in the local land office and other interested
actors. In khas lease issues, this group maintains good relations with the
land office, often sharing financial benefits with officials. Thus, the land
office, big landholders and mastaans have an interest in evicting land-
less people from the khas land. Moreover, due to the negative con-
notation of dakhaldar, occupation by landless poor is considered tem-
porary, and their eviction justified any time. According to the
Ordinance of 1982, khas land should be acquired first when a project
Box 2
Accounts 'from below' of experiences with pressures on land.
Mr. Polash, a smallholder, lived on land in the project area, combining khas and titled land. Besides, he owned one acre of shrimp gher in the
project area, inherited from his parents. Before the 1980s, as a subsistence farmer he cultivated paddy and other crops on that land. In the mid-
1980s, his land was flooded with saline water. He and other small farmers tried to drain out the saline water, in vain: politically powerful
shrimp farmers and mastaans had occupied the adjacent khals (drainage canals). Gradually, the area became a perennial saline water reservoir.
Later, Mr. Polash transformed his land into shrimp gher. His entire (extended) family depended on income from it. However, they lost it all in
the land acquisition.
Another smallholder, Mr. Hasan, had migrated into the project site with his family from a nearby village and lived there until land
accumulation for the power plant project. Before the 1980s, he owned 0.5 acres of agricultural land in his village, cultivating paddy and other
crops, and doing paid agricultural labour. In the mid-1980s, mastaans grabbed his land. He filed a court case to the local court to regain control
over his land, which is still sub judice due to the inert legal system. To meet the costs of the court case and for his family, he took a loan from a
local NGO. He finally had to sell his homestead land to repay the NGO, becoming an absolute landless. He and his family migrated to the
project area, living on khas land and doing shrimp farm labour since the mid-1990s. His two sons also do shrimp farm labour, while his wife
works a kitchen garden for the family. The land acquisition dispossessed and evicted his family.
Mr. Raju is a large landholder and local political boss of the ruling party. He and his family live in Khulna city. His family used to own 12.00
acres of land in the project area. Although the land (shrimp gher) is entitled to his father, he had it cultivated (crops) by tenants, sharing the
benefits with his family. In the mid-1980s, he converted the land into shrimp gher and started commercial shrimp production. Its higher cash
return inspired him to expand the gher. He leased two more acres of khas land and (through hari) about three acres of private land.
Additionally, he grabbed four acres of khas land and three acres of private land. Thus, the total size of his gher was about 24 acres of land. He
earned a significant amount of money from this gher, which helped him to become politically influential in that area. Although he lost all land
in the acquisition, he received compensation for the 12 acres he owned.
22 Interview with representative of the Assistant Commissioner, (Land) office,
Rampal Upazila (26 September, 2016).
23 See http://rampal.bagerhat.gov.bd/ (accessed 11 December 2016).
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requires both khas and private land. If a project acquires only khas, it
will be transferred through an inter-ministerial meeting following the
preparation of an acquisition proposal submitted to the District
Commissioner and/or the Ministry of Land. Thus the authority does not
recognise any unauthorized occupation, such as by landless people, in
the acquired area, nor does it inform landless people or discuss its plans
with them.
According to the field data, the acquired land was a combination of
khas land (912 acres, 49.7 % of total) and private land (922 acres, 50.03
% of total). Although much khas land was controlled by powerful
shrimp cultivators and mastaans, much was also controlled by landless
people. As the ordinance does not recognize their rights to khas land,
the government evicted the landless ‘occupiers’. Initially, the landless
and entitled landholders, having a common interest, jointly protested
the dispossession by demonstrations. However, the locally elected au-
thorities, mastaans, ruling party politicians, state forces (police; para-
military), and other vested interest groups intimidated protesters to
make them stay away from such manifestations. Hence, entitled land-
holders connected to ruling party political actors gradually refrained
from protests. Large landholders with positions in the ruling party
joined the party interests, accepting compensation, seeking financial
gains from the project, and intimidating protesters. Some small,
medium and large landholders continued protesting and did not accept
compensation yet. However, the landless group lost out easily because
of its vulnerable position.
The authorities committed themselves to resettling landless and
vulnerable landholders to their preferred locations. This study, how-
ever, found that only 18 out of 104 households were resettled in a
cluster village24 in the same upazila, although the project authority
claimed resettlement of all project-affected people. As the Ordinance of
1982 does not oblige the government to resettle or rehabilitate the
landless, resettlement can be presented as a government service to the
poor. ‘Resettlement’, as used by the authorities, stresses their generosity
in dealing with people who lost their land. However, this framing
completely conceals the government’s violation of the rights of the
landless poor to khas land. In addition, the government presents re-
settlement as an unavoidable by-product of development, but never
acknowledges that the landless poor tend to be the main victims. This
is, of course, crucially related to political and policy choices made in
land allocation for development, and to the power relations that in-
fluence these processes more generally. A typical reaction was: ‘these
landless poor are in a good position, they got a house nearby an urban
area [….] What did we get? Nothing, but we lost our source of income’
(Interview, 2016).25
In practice, resettlement provides 0.06 acres of (khas) land with a
room for each resettled household. Land lease for 99 years is condi-
tional and subject to payment of land development tax and other fees.
The state authority can cancel the agreement anytime during this
period. In contrast to their former houses with multiple rooms and
kitchen gardens, the small one-room resettlement houses cannot be
expanded. Moreover, the urban resettlement location hampers re-
settlers in getting a job, due to the mismatch with their previous rural
experience and unfamiliarity with the new area. They cannot engage
in project activities either, since they live far away without linkages
to labour recruiters. Finally, the uncertainties of resettlement are
enormous because resettlers have no access to urban khas land.
Although the government issued the Non-Agricultural Khas Land
Policy in 1995, it does not guarantee land allocation to the landless
(Herrera, 2016; BLAST, 2005). As powerful actors usually occupy
urban areas, where the land value is higher, access of poor people to
urban khas land is very limited. Thus, resettlement leads to double
exclusion: from agricultural khas land by resettling people in an urban
area, and from urban khas land by government policies and realities of
urban land control.
4.2.3. Leaseholders
Currently, three land leasing systems have been adopted by shrimp
cultivators: (1) lease of private land (hari); (2) one-year lease of khas
land with the option of temporary extension; (3) lease of khas land for
over one year with possibility of extension (long-term). Although a
fourth modality, lease of khas land for 99 years (permanent alloca-
tion), is found in the region; but the government no longer authorizes
this allocation to shrimp cultivators, except to landless people.
Furthermore, if there is khas land adjacent to an entitled holding,
which can negatively affect the latter but also contribute to the live-
lihoods of the titled landholder, the owner can lease that khas land
under any terms.
In the hari system, titled landholders lease out land to shrimp cul-
tivators. After the contract period, both parties can renew the contract.
The owner has the residual land right but delegates temporary use
rights to the hari receivers. These are not allowed to convert land but
can cultivate shrimp. The land accumulation pushed out leaseholders
from their contracted land. If accumulation took place before the con-
tract ended, leaseholders often did not get back the remaining contract
amount, nor any compensation for unharvested shrimps. The khas land
leasing system followed the guidelines of the Khas Land Management
and Distribution Policy of 1997. In this shrimp culture zone, khas land
was leased out to shrimp cultivators to promote export. In practice,
leaseholders paid lease to the government to get legal rights to the land.
However, termination of the contract pushed out the lessees and de-
stroyed their prospect of becoming entitled landholders.
4.2.4. Powerful and politically connected land controllers
This category includes grabbers of both khas and private land, in-
cluding mastaans, politically powerful actors and absentee landlords.
However, project-driven land accumulation was a threat for them as
well, as it re-allocated land towards industrial purposes. In the histor-
ical trajectory of land control, these landholders dispossessed small and
marginal landholders, and the landless. Mastaans are always active in
land grabbing, although they have changed their roles with changing
circumstances. Commercial shrimp cultivation in the southwestern re-
gion was introduced by outside entrepreneurs (see above), who first
connected this area with the global shrimp market. Later, others fol-
lowed and, backed by local political bosses, introduced ‘aggressive’
shrimp cultivation by grabbing state-owned khas and private entitled
land. Because of their aggressive practices they were called mastaans
(Box 1). In the 1980s, when commercial shrimp cultivation was offi-
cially recognized and booming, these mastaans expanded their gher area
by grabbing creeks, fallow land, private land etc. Local and outsider
mastaans forced smallholder crop producers to surrender their land to
them by intimidation and creating negative externalities (letting saline
water into farmers’ land). Most large and medium landholders, often
including local political bosses, converted their land into shrimp gher
and gradually became participants in land grabbing, using the methods
of mastaans.
Mastaans have significantly influenced local politics with their
muscle power and revenues from shrimp production, and thus gained
established positions in local politics. This gave local political bosses
and powerful shrimp cultivators a strong social status, which they used
to increase their financial gains and their power. Powerful shrimp
producers-cum-land controllers maintained good relations with land
office officials, often sharing financial benefits with them to get in-
formation and access to khas land. However, this has led to violent
conflicts between land grabbers and landowners, and among land
24 Cluster village (guccha gram): planned settlement area with uniformly de-
signed houses to resettle homeless, dispossessed, and evicted people.
25 Interview with a group of entitled small landholders who used to cultivate
shrimp. They were resettled and only received a house as compensation. The
quoted remark by one of them was shared by all (interview Barni Union
Parishad, Rampal Upazila, 12 October, 2016).
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controllers themselves regarding the control (dakhal26) of land or gher
(see Islam, 2006). Mastaans without political positions often served
their political bosses in land grabbing.
However, the power plant project has changed the game, involving
mastaans in a different way. Many are now involved in land dealing as
dalal (land broker). They often intimidate titled landholders not to sell
directly to private investors, as they prefer to play a brokerage role
between landholders and investing companies. Often they work on
behalf of ruling party politicians or bosses, intimidating protesting
landholders and informing the police about resistance. Thus the
changes in land control have generated considerable personal benefits
for those who control land. While the ruling party entrusted political
bosses with the task of supporting the project, the latter ordered clients
and mastaans to ensure access to sufficient land. Additional benefits are
shared in this alliance between state and non-state actors. One example
is the possibility to cultivate shrimp on a temporary basis on accumu-
lated land, two-third of which had not yet been developed for the power
plant by 2015. While those who had lost land and marginal shrimp
cultivators tried to get temporary access to this land, they had no
chance against those who are politically connected and powerful, and
close to those who control the land (see Box 3).
5. Discussion
The Rampal coal-fired power plant project is presented as a cor-
nerstone of Bangladesh’s latest development strategy. In and around
Rampal, this has started a new wave of exclusion and dispossession
caused by the power plant and newly-establishing industries. Although
pressures on land are growing, these developments largely continue
earlier patterns. Like before, current transfers of effective land control
(Hall, 2013; for Bangladesh, see Adnan, 2016) for the power plant in-
volve various processes and mechanisms of exclusion, dispossession and
displacement: direct and indirect, forced and unforced, based on market
mechanisms and non-market mechanisms (Adnan, 2016; Hall et al.,
2011; Ribot and Peluso, 2003), and involving both in situ and ex situ
forms of displacement (Feldman and Geisler, 2012). In analysing these,
we distinguished four major categories of land users: entitled land-
owners, absolute landless, leaseholders, and powerful and politically
connected controllers of land. The actual property relations and prac-
tices in which these categories of land users are engaged are much more
complex and diverse than those recognized in state laws and policies:
state-owned khas land and privately-owned titled land. They involve
the combined workings of processes and mechanisms of property
creation and transformation, of access and exclusion, accumulation and
dispossession.
The earlier, pre-power plant period of shrimp-based development
saw both voluntary and involuntary processes and mechanisms of
transformation of land control. Many farmers, big and small, volunta-
rily followed the booming shrimp market and turned their land into
shrimp ghers. Others, however, were confronted with pressures and
violence from local strongmen and thugs to give up their land, or were
forced out of agriculture in a more indirect way by the saline ‘facts on
the ground’ created by their powerful neighbours or others interested in
taking over their land. This can be regarded as a form of in situ dis-
placement (Feldman and Geisler, 2012; see Adnan, 2013). Khas land,
initially reserved for the poorest by law, is often allocated to well-to-do
farmers, and then privatized and legalized in a way that excludes the
poor.
While entitled landowners and powerful controllers of land are re-
latively tenure secure, especially landless people working khas land and
leaseholders tend to lose out in the elite-dominated land control pro-
cesses in aquaculture and, more recently, related to Rampal.
Recognition and legalization of land as privately owned property tends
to be easier for those with money, political connections and the power
to maintain access and control of the land than for those who lack these
resources (see Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Bangladesh’s land relations are
governed by a ‘3D’ principle: dalil, dakhila and dakhal. Dalil refers to
legal documents for the entitled owner, dakhila to receipts for land tax
payment and lease, and dakhal to occupation of land. Dalil and dakhila
are controlled and authorized by the Land Offices. In principle, land-
holders with these documents can exert control over land. Government
agencies use their powers to legalize land acquired for the power plant
company and turn it into legally sanctioned property. With the gov-
ernment providing legal documents, and the company paying taxes for
land and leased-in khas land, private investors become legal owners.
As the government does not recognize occupation of khas land by
non-allottee landless people, it is not responsible for payment of com-
pensation. Farmers who lost their land by acquisition were either not
compensated or given too little to buy new land elsewhere. Depending
on access to state-controlled khas land as allottee or non-allottee, and
often facing threats of dispossession by shrimp gher owners, the abso-
lute landless were in the weakest position. If they accessed land at all, it
was temporary and under continuous threat of exclusion by the Land
Office, cooperating with landowners, mastaans, and politicians.
Resettlement of evicted landless people often amounts to ex-situ dis-
placement to the city. Leaseholders and land or shrimp farm labourers
Box 3
Impacts of land acquisition for the power plant on land control.
Mr. Jamal, a smallholder, owned one acre of shrimp farm. With acquisition for the power plant, he and other landholders had to move out,
with compensation from the District Commissioner (DC) office. After almost all land users, including landless labourers, small and big
landholders had refused to accept compensation and protested, the police, in cooperation with ruling party political supporters and mastaans,
attacked them. After that day, Mr. Jamal left the village for fear of arrest or attack. Later, when he and his family returned, they found his
house damaged by mastaans, so he decided to move again. He received compensation but had to pay a bribe to the DC office. With the
remaining money, he tried to purchase new land. However, he could not afford the land prices, skyrocketing under the influence of speculators
and investors.
Medium and large landholders like Mr. Salem and Mr. Faizul also became dispossessed. Initially almost all of them protested the land
acquisitions in a coalition with smallholders and landless people. Later on, those connected with the ruling political party not only left the
protests, but also started to threaten anti-power plant protesters and became involved in land dealing. Powerful shrimp cultivators among them
took control of temporarily unutilized land acquired for the power plant, to temporarily use it. They could do so by payments, using political
power, relations with authorities, or sharing of financial benefits. The smallholders, who used to own such land before its acquisition, could not
get such temporary access.
A large shrimp cultivator who benefited from shrimp cultivation in unutilized land was Mr. Babul, then acting chairman of a Union
Parishad. In addition, he also controlled a large shrimp gher adjacent to the power plant project area. When asked about the land, he argued
that “we helped in getting the land for the power plant, and prevented miscreants from using it, following the order of our Member of
Parliament”.
26 Dakhal refers to either forceful or non-forceful occupation, which implies
the presence of power (see Suykens, 2015)
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were in a similar position, with the additional risk for leasers to lose
part of the lease money and of investments in land or fishpond.
Transfers of land to the project inevitably led to their exclusion.
While dispossessed landless and leaseholders have few options,
powerful landowners and thugs with interests in land have more op-
tions available. Many of them had an earlier track record of using force,
intimidation and violence in dispossessing small farmers from their
land. As they could access and mobilize social and political networks to
protect their interests, they tended to benefit from the land transfor-
mations for Rampal. Even if they could not avoid land alienation and
had to face loss of their land, most of them received compensation,
protected by their power, connections and political affiliations to the
ruling party, and could thus capitalize their (often illegally acquired)
land.
What is new in these changes, and what just an intensification of
existing structures of exploitation and land control? Under current
conditions, we see mainly continuities with earlier aquaculture-based
development. As explained, the new development vision prioritizes
electricity generation for industrial development. Although the in-
dustrial model currently applied in Rampal largely encroaches on
former aquaculture land, it is not meant to fully replace aquaculture.
From this perspective, the local manifestation in Rampal of the current
national development model seems primarily a deepening of capitalist
investments and production into rural southwestern Bangladesh.
Current modes of land acquisition and control build on processes and
mechanisms that also characterized earlier aquaculture expansion.
Property-owning elite-biased laws and policy guidelines, like the
modified Property Rights and Allotment Law of 1974 and the
Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance of 1982,
laid a legal-institutional basis for current marginalization and dis-
possession practices for the power plant. Laws also allow local autho-
rities to take possession of khas land, and exclude poor and landless
farmers from it.
Depending on further developments related to the Rampal power
plant, several scenarios are possible that could also entail a deepening
and further intensification of these changes. We stress that these are
possible futures that cannot be generalized beyond Rampal and its
surroundings (but might take place elsewhere as well, of course). We
distinguish two scenarios: power-based industrialization, and a com-
bination of industrialization (including aqua-/agro-industrial develop-
ment) with expansion of shrimp aquaculture. In the first scenario,
power plant companies and industrial investors will take control of land
to permanently convert it into non-agricultural functions under a pri-
vate property regime. The planning and establishment of economic
zones could further stimulate these processes. This scenario would
provide an opportunity for external land dealers and corporate en-
trepreneurs in land acquisition, who wait for prices to rise and then sell
to industrial investors. Presently such entrepreneurs are already active
in the Rampal area. An example is the Lithi Group, a well-known
company that has purchased land and claimed land in the shrimp ghers,
and searched for investors. Part of the less productive smallholders and
medium holders will be willing to sell land; the same goes for land-
holders whose land has been taken without payment of rent or lease.
This scenario might also bring in more foreign actors, primarily from
India as international partner for investments in capital, coal and
technology.27
In the second scenario, shrimp cultivators from outside will settle
more permanently in the area. If shrimp cultivation becomes revitalized
and more productive, this might attract new commercial shrimp culti-
vators from outside who take control of land. They might become an
even more powerful group linked to aqua-industry and export, for
which the government might even relax regulations pertaining to land
control. In this scenario, dispossession of powerless landholders and
land concentration will continue at a high pace.
The Rampal project represents recently formulated wider regional
political-economic ambitions for the future, framed as of key im-
portance for the country: industrialization-based development, main-
taining good relations with India, and linking up with international
(South-Asian) economic networks as a regional key player. If materi-
alizing, the scenarios discussed above would add a new dynamic to
ongoing struggles between local smallholders and large cultivators,
crop-producing farmers and shrimp cultivators, and subsistence-or-
iented versus predatory land control (see also Peluso and Lund, 2011).
Despite promises to generate employment for the dispossessed, we
found that the power plant creates more space for elite-driven land
tenure changes and land control. Local institutions and officials take an
active part in, and assist the land transformations, by aligning with
vested interest groups. They do so, for instance, by assisting land bro-
kers in land deals and by involving themselves in those deals for fi-
nancial benefit and other favours from the ruling political party. The
principle of dakhal mentioned above helps to explain this. Dakhal refers
to forceful or non-forceful occupation (Suykens, 2015). It is more or less
equivalent with ‘access’, the ability to benefit (Ribot and Peluso, 2003).
Gaining access requires enabling bundles of power, supporting both
rights-based and illicit mechanisms. While the former refer to the legal
entitlements sanctioned by law, custom or convention, the latter refers
to ways of gaining access not sanctioned by state and society, such as
coercion and grabbing, by maintaining good relations with those who
control access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Such land accumulation re-
quires forceful occupation by the state, in collaboration with ruling
party political actors, supporters, and mastaans.
Landownership, linkage with the administration and non-agri-
cultural sources of income are the three important variables giving
access to the rural power structure (Hossain, 2006). ‘Administration’
however is not a neutral counterforce to local structures. The politici-
zation of Bangladesh’s bureaucracy, built in from independence, has
been intensifying since the country’s democratization (1991–2006),
while later reforms have been cosmetic (Akhtar, 2019). In Bangladesh’s
rent-seeking political system, political parties have ‘pursued individual
interests, contributing to the erosion of the foundations of democracy,
governance, rule of law and social justice’ (Alam and Teicher, 2012),
while ‘decentralization’ has worked out such that local power and de-
cision-making remain conditioned by central control (Barenstein, 2000,
cited in Nadiruzzaman, 2008). Unless wealthy, powerful and politically
connected, those affected by dispossession have little to expect from the
bureaucracy and judiciary, due to this political capture (Alam and
Teicher, 2012).
6. Conclusion
As stated in its latest development visions, the Government of
Bangladesh aims to propel the country into the middle-income status by
2021 and the developed status by 2041. To reach these goals, the
country has put its bets on a strategy of national industrialization. It has
identified the Southwest Region as a growth center and (inter-)national
trade gateway into South Asia. This new development vision partly
replaces, or adds to, an earlier one that was primarily based on (shrimp
and prawn) aquaculture in the coastal zone. While this model has not
been discarded and continues to generate huge economic benefits, re-
cent developments in southwestern Bangladesh, with the Rampal power
plant project in Rampal District propagated as a key starter, give a first
impression of what a further move towards industrial development
could mean for land control and the position of the marginal and
landless rural population.
The Rampal power plant project, an Indo-Bangladeshi investment, is
justified by the promise of developing a disadvantaged area, the
27 The energy sector topped the list of future Indian investments in
Bangladesh, amounting to nearly $10 billion (Dhaka Tribune, June 02, 2017).
(link: http://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2017/04/12/bangladesh-india-
sign-finance-deal-rampal-plant/).
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regional and the national economy. Power-led industrialization, cur-
rently in full swing in Rampal and its surroundings, is further shaking
up existing forms of property, access to land and land control. The
Rampal project and new industrial activities attracted by it require
large areas of land. Through its acquisition practices the project threw
the door wide open to mechanisms of political clientelism and mass
dispossession, not only of the landless but also of middle and large-scale
landowners in the shrimp sector, who lost their —often illegally ac-
quired— property in the name of development.
From the vantage point of these changes in land control and land
rights, interventions framed as ‘developmental’ like Rampal may rather
be seen as counter-developmental, creating or perpetuating problems of
underdevelopment rather than tackling them. Even aside from the
serious environmental concerns raised against the project, in the
Rampal case development is a change for the worse for the many under
the promise of a future change to the better for all. ‘Development’, in
this case, stands for political patronage, corruption, threats and the
exertion of violence, which have facilitated the dispossession of poor
and marginalized groups rather than the improvement of their lives.
The ‘politicization of everything’ in Bangladesh closes off modes of
redress for those affected, unless one has the right political connections
locally or with higher levels, which, in spite of decentralization, have
increasingly strong tentacles in local power structures.
The Rampal power plant is not a total break with the past but
symptoms of a further deepening of international and global capitalist
relations, showing both continuities and changes. We see important
continuities with the earlier expansion of capitalist aquaculture-based
growth. Each round of ‘development’, whether aquaculture-based or
power plant-led, churns out large numbers of ‘surplus people’ (Li,
2011), whose land use is regarded as not having any developmental
value, and for whom there are no jobs or other opportunities. However,
we also see changes, mainly in terms of the (currently) more radical
transformations in land control, new actors involved, new ambitions,
and the impacts on livelihoods and social relations of production,
particularly in aquaculture.
If we look beyond the state ideology of development and focus, in-
stead, on its legal-institutional manifestations and the practices of land
control and dispossession legitimized by them, we see a predatory form
of dispossession without development for its victims (see Levien, 2018).
There seems to be more than a grain of truth, then, to the —no doubt
unintended— pun in the ruling Awami League's self-congratulatory
Power and Energy paragraph, which states that ‘… it will be possible to
connect additional electricity to the national greed [sic] by 2017’.28
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